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A Superfund Solution for an 
Economic Love Canal 
 
Mehmet K. Konar-­Steenberg* 
 
´7KHUHLVVLPSO\QRJRRGUHDVRQIRUXVWRUHVSRQGWRRQHW\SHRI
release of a poison, but not another.  The test should not be 
whether poison was released into river water rather than into 
well water;; or by toxic waste buried in the ground rather than 
toxic waste discharged to the ground.  The test should be 
whether the poison was released.  I assure you that the victim 
GRHV QRW FDUH WR PDNH WKRVH GLVWLQFWLRQV QRU VKRXOG ZHµ 
 
Senator Robert T. Stafford1 
 
Introduction 
 
Consider this scenario: A profitable but hazardous 
LQGXVWU\·V ZRUVW-­case risks come to pass.  Neighborhoods are 
boarded-­up and residents dislocated.  Poor and minority 
communities are hit particularly hard because they offered the 
OHDVW UHVLVWDQFH WR WKH LQGXVWU\·V TXHVWLRQDEOH SUDFWLFHV³
practices virtually unregulated by the government and 
undeterred by the tort system.  The scope of the resulting 
disaster necessitates massive taxpayer-­funded remediation and 
sparks popular demands for accountability on the part of those 
who profited while communities died. 
These were the essential features of the toxic waste crisis 
that confronted policymakers during the 1970s.  Their 
UHVSRQVH WKH ´6XSHUIXQGµ OHJDO UHJLPH DQVZHUHG Falls for 
accountability by establishing new liability rules for past risky 
conduct.  Under Superfund, a range of businesses that 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.  My 
thanks to Prentiss Cox, Mark Edwards, Daniel Kleinberger, Anne F. 
Peterson, Eileen Roberts, Thuy Vo, and the Pace symposium participants for 
their helpful critiques of this proposal. 
1. Senator Robert T. Stafford, Why Superfund Was Needed, EPA 
JOURNAL, June 1981, available at 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/cercla/04.htm. 
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contributed to past contamination of a site became strictly, 
retroactively, and jointly-­and-­severally liable for the cost of 
cleaning up the mess³regardless of whether their conduct was 
lawful at the time it occurred.  Moreover, some courts 
implementing this new liability regime saw fit to loosen 
ordinary corporate liability rules so that parent corporations 
and corporate officers ZKR FRQWUROOHG D FRUSRUDWLRQ·V ZDVWH
disposal activities might be held directly liable for the cleanup.  
Businesses criticized this reconfiguration of liability rules as 
unanticipated and, therefore, unfair, while environmental 
interests eventually complained about poor implementation 
and slow remediation.  But despite the criticisms and 
implementation problems, Superfund succeeded in holding at 
least some polluters responsible for their actions.  It also 
established an important precedent for imposing strict liability 
based on past risky commercial conduct that caused 
community-­wide harms.  
Of course, many of these same features³from boarded 
neighborhoods to ineffective government regulation to demands 
for post-­hoc legal accountability³also characterize the 
subprime mortgage crisis.  This essay argues that these 
striking similarities justify an analogous solution: a Superfund-­
style accountability regime designed to address the current 
subprime mortgage mess and to avoid future ones.  Specifically, 
this essay argues that Congress should complement local, 
state, and federal economic cleanup that is already occurring 
with new legal mechanisms patterned on the essential features 
of Superfund liability: strict, retroactive, and joint-­and-­several 
liability coupled with broad corporate liability options for those 
actors sharing responsibility for the mess.  
Part I compares the toxic waste and toxic asset crises, 
focusing on common causes, common effects, and common 
barriers to legal accountability, in order to make the case that 
an analogous response is warranted.  Part II then explains how 
6XSHUIXQG·V NH\ OHJDO IHDWXUHV PLJKW EH DGDSWHG WRZDUGV D
legislative regime of accountability for the mortgage crisis.  
 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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I. Toxic Waste, Toxic Assets 
 
In early 2007, business reporters started using the 
HYRFDWLYH SKUDVH ´WR[LF DVVHWµ DV D PHWDSKRU IRU VHFXULWLHV
containing bundled mortgage loans, including subprime loans, 
which had begun to cause difficulties on the secondary 
mortgage market.2  Despite efforts by two presidential 
administrations to replace this phrase with euphemisms 
tending to deflect attention from the poisonous impacts of these 
DVVHWV WKH WHUP ´WR[LF DVVHWµ HQGXUHV3  This section argues 
that this durable metaphor should be taken one step further 
and treated as an analogy.  Specifically, the toxic lending crisis 
of the early twenty-­first century is substantially analogous to 
the toxic chemical waste crisis of the later twentieth century in 
four key ways: causes, effects on communities, political 
responses, and legal barriers to accountability. 
 
A. Analogous Causes 
 
At its core, the toxic waste crisis was the byproduct of 
profitable commercial activities whose risks were ineffectively 
regulated by government administrative agencies, undeterred 
by existing tort liability principles, and, as a result, 
externalized on to society as a whole.  Widespread generation 
and disposal of hazardous chemical wastes were necessary 
components of industrialization and the postwar economic 
boom.4  But state and federal laws did not effectively regulate 
 
2. $ /H[LV1H[LV VHDUFK RQ WKH SKUDVH ´WR[LF DVVHWµ LQ WKH $//1EWS 
database indicates that the first usage of this phrase in connection with the 
subprime lending crisis appeared in an article by Chidem Kurdas in the 
HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS bearing the title, Funds Selling Securitized 
0RUWJDJHV)DFH%X\HUV·0DUNHW, on March 27, 2007. 
3. 7KH %XVK $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ RIIHUHG WKH WHUP ´WURXEOHG DVVHWVµ DV LQ
´7URXEOHG $VVHWV 5HOLHI 3URJUDPµ ZKLOH WKH 2EDPD $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ
DSSDUHQWO\SUHIHUVWRFDOOWKHP´OHJDF\DVVHWVµRUDWOHDVW´VR-­called legacy 
DVVHWVµSee, e.g., Timothy Geithner, Opinion, My Plan for Bad Bank Assets, 
WALL ST. J. 0DU   DW $ ´0DQ\ EDQNV VWLOO EXUGHQHG E\ EDG
lending decisions, are holding back on providing credit.  Market prices for 
many assets held by financial institutions³so-­called legacy assets³are 
HLWKHUXQFHUWDLQRUGHSUHVVHGµ 
4. See JOHN A. HIRD, SUPERFUND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 4 (1994);; Stafford, supra note 1. 
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hazardous waste disposal prior to the environmental 
awakening of the 1970s,5 resulting in an approach to hazardous 
ZDVWHPDQDJHPHQWWKDWRQHFRPPHQWDWRUGHVFULEHVDV´RXWRI
VLJKW RXW RI PLQGµ6  Beginning in the 1970s the Federal 
Government did begin to impose prospective regulation on 
hazardous waste disposal.7  %XW WKHSUREOHPRI$PHULFD·V ROG
and abandoned hazardous waste dumps remained essentially 
unaddressed by federal law.  State regulation was similarly 
immature through this period,8 and common-­law tort liability 
was not up to the task of deterring dumping, as the adverse 
impacts of the act would not be felt for years or decades.  The 
inadequacy of this threadbare legal regime was eventually 
made manifest in the form of Love Canal and other toxic waste 
disasters.9 
 
5. See EPA, Press Release, Costle Presses for Immediate Passage of 
Superfund (Sept. 11, 1980), available at 
KWWSZZZHSDJRYKLVWRU\WRSLFVFHUFODKWP ´([LVWLQJ VWDWXWHV and 
programs are completely overwhelmed by the problem facing us daily from oil 
DQGKD]DUGRXVVXEVWDQFHVSLOOVDQGUHOHDVHVIURPKD]DUGRXVZDVWHVLWHVµ 
6. David R. Case, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 133 (Christopher L. Bell et al. eds., 19th ed. 
2007).  See also 3 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A-­18 
 ´,Q PDQ\ LQVWDQFHV >6XSHUIXQG@ DSSOLHV WR GLVSRVDO VLWHV ZKLFK JR
back to World War II and before, when disposal of hazardous waste was not 
RQHRIWKHFRXQWU\·VPDMRUSULRULWLHVµ 
7. See generally HIRD, supra note 4, at 9.  In 1976, Congress adopted the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) primarily to control present 
and future production and disposal of hazardous wastes.  Pub. L. No. 94-­580, 
90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-­6992k (2006)).  The 
RCRA also authorized the Federal Government to order responsible parties 
to remediate existing hazardous waste dumps, but it did not include a 
provision dealing with site cleanup where the responsible party could not be 
located.  JULIAN B. ANDELMAN & DWIGHT W. UNDERHILL, HEALTH EFFECTS 
FROM HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 61 (1987).  Other federal laws provided 
authority and funding to remediate hazardous waste dumped in navigable 
waters.  KATHLEEN SELLERS, FUNDAMENTALS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE SITE 
REMEDIATION 78 (1999). 
8. New York, for example, where Love Canal is located, did not have a 
unified state environmental agency until 1970.  New York State Department 
of Environmental Conservation, History of DEC, 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/about/9677.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2009). 
9. ´7KH VLWXDWLRQ FRQFHUQLQJ KD]DUGRXV ZDVWH GLVSRVDO VLWHV LV JULPµ
explained EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle in a 1980 press release 
urging adoption of Superfund legislation.  EPA, supra note 5. 
 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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This same coupling of very risky commercial behavior with 
inadequate legal limitations helped produce the current 
subprime mortgage crisis.  Subprime loans are, by definition, 
abnormally risky loans.10  Like the production of industrial 
chemicals, these kinds of loans can be profitable to lenders and 
benefit society.  Most notably, subprime loans expand 
opportunities for home ownership and the economic and social 
advantages that go along with it.11  Unfortunately, like the 
 
The past few years have brought to public attention an 
unforgettable series of incidents resulting from improper 
hazardous waste management³the continuing tragedy of 
Love Canal, the pollution of the water supply of over 
300,000 people in Iowa, and the discovery of up to 20,000 to 
30,000 discarded and leaking barrels of chemical wastes in 
WKH ´9DOOH\ RI WKH 'UXPVµ LQ .HQWXFN\  ,Q  (3$
estimated the number of hazardous waste sites to range 
between 32,000 and 50,000, and the number of sites posing 
a significant health or environmental problem to be between 
1,200 and 2,000. 
 
Id.;; see also GRAD, supra note 6, § 4A-­ ´,QGHHG WKH HQDFWPHQW RI
[Superfund] was in part a response to the discovery of hazardous or 
catastrophic consequences of earlier disposals of hazardous waste, such as, 
IRULQVWDQFHLQWKH/RYH&DQDOVLWXDWLRQµ 
10. See, e.g., Memorandum from Richard M. Riccobono, Deputy Director, 
Office of Thrift Supervision, to Chief Executive Officers, Expanded Guidance 
for Subprime Lending Programs (Feb. 2, 2001), available at 
http://files.ots.treas.gov/25137.pdf ´6XESULPH ERUURZHUV W\SLFDOO\ KDYH
weakened credit histories that include payment delinquencies, and possibly 
more severe problems such as charge-­offs, judgments, and bankruptcies.  
They may also display reduced repayment capacity as measured by credit 
scores, debt-­to-­income ratios, or other criteria that may encompass borrowers 
ZLWK LQFRPSOHWH FUHGLW KLVWRULHVµ.  See also Danielle DiMartino & John V. 
Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime Mortgages, ECON. LETTER, Nov. 2007, 
available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0711.html 
´6XESULPH PRUWJDJHV DUH H[WHQGHG WR DSSOLFDQWV GHHPHG WKH OHDVW
creditworthy because of low credit scores or uncertain income prospects, both 
of which reflect the highest default risk and warrant the highest interest 
UDWHVµ,QWKH'HSDUWPHQWRIWKH7UHDVXU\UHMHFWHGLQGXVWU\FDOOVIRUD
´EULJKW-­OLQHµ GHILQLWLRQ FKRRVing instead to continue to rely upon its 2001 
([SDQGHG*XLGDQFHZKLFKWKH'HSDUWPHQWVD\V´SURYLGHVDUDQJHRIFUHGLW
risk characteristics that are associated with subprime borrowers, noting that 
the characteristics are illustrative and are not meant to define specific 
SDUDPHWHUVIRUDOOVXESULPHERUURZHUVµOFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, DEP·T OF THE TREASURY, STATEMENT ON SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
LENDING 7-­8 (2007), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2007-­
64a.pdf (footnote omitted). 
11. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP·T OF HOUSING & URBAN 
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inadequate regulation of industrial chemical waste production 
in the first part of the previous century, the regulation of 
industrial-­scale subprime lending in the first part of this 
century was not commensurate with the risks. 
At the federal level, the dominant mortgage regulation 
philosophy for the past twenty-­five years was, alas, to 
GHUHJXODWHDV3URIHVVRU'L/RUHQ]R·VDUWLFOHHOVHZKHUH LQWKLV
volume thoroughly documents.12  Starting in 1982, Congress 
voted to eliminate hard-­wired statutory controls that limited 
the mortgage lending conducted by federally chartered banks 
and thrifts and, instead, voted to implement a to-­be-­announced 
system of administrative agency oversight.13  The Reagan 
Administration agency officials charged with implementing 
this new authority settled on a regulatory strategy that they 
GHVFULEHGDV´LPSRV>LQJ@QROLPLWDWLRQVRQQDWLRQDOEDQNV·UHDO
estate lending and rescind[ing] current regulations which do 
LPSRVH OLPLWDWLRQVµ14  This laissez-­faire regulatory approach 
persisted even after Congress was forced to respond to the 
savings-­and-­loan crisis in the 1990s.  For example, when 
&RQJUHVV PDQGDWHG WKH DGRSWLRQ RI ´XQLIRUP UHJXODWLRQV
prescribing standards for real estate lending by insured 
GHSRVLWRU\LQVWLWXWLRQVµLQUHJXODWRUVDGRpted regulations 
containing general principles rather than specific 
requirements.15  Even as late as 2007, federal officials 
responding to the boom in subprime lending were issuing 
 
DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: INCOME & RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING 
IN AMERICA 1 (2000), 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/unequal_full.pdf ´By providing 
loans to borrowers who do not meet the credit standards for borrowers in the 
prime market, subprime lending can and does serve a critical role in the 
1DWLRQ·V HFRQRP\  7KHVH ERUURZHUV PD\ KDYH EOHPLVKHV LQ WKHLU FUHGLW
record, insufficient credit history or non-­traditional credit sources.  Through 
the subprime loan market, they can buy a new home, improve their existing 
KRPHRUUHILQDQFHWKHLUPRUWJDJHWRLQFUHDVHWKHLUFDVKRQKDQGµ 
12. See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Unsafe Loans in a Deregulated 
U.S. Mortgage Market, 30 PACE L. REV. 154 (2009). 
13. See Garn-­St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. 
No. 97-­320, 96 Stat. 1469. 
14. Real Estate Lending by National Banks, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,698, 40,699 
(Sept. 9, 1983) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7 & 34). 
15. Di Lorenzo, supra note 12, at 156-­57.   
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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´JXLGDQFHµGRFXPHQWVUDWKHUWKDQHQIRUFHDEOHUHJXODWLRQV16 
Other federal laws offered safeguards that were too limited 
in their reach to be effective.  For example, the promisingly 
WLWOHG´+RPH2ZQHUVKLSDQG(TXLW\3URWHFWLRQ$FWµ +2(3$
adopted in 1994 was limited by unrealistic trigger 
requirements and did not even apply to home purchase loans or 
home equity lines of credit;; as a result, relatively few loans fell 
ZLWKLQ WKH VFRSH RI WKH VWDWXWH·V SURWHFWLRQV17  The result of 
these years of deregulation was the proliferation of loans made 
with unconventional terms and without serious evaluation of 
repayment ability or borrower equity.18 
At the state level, self-­evidently, neither regulation nor 
potential tort liability served to adequately deter the kind of 
lending behavior leading to the present crisis.  In part, this was 
because the same deregulationist philosophy that led federal 
officials to adopt a hands-­off approach in their own regulatory 
sphere led them to impose the same result on state regulation 
of nationally chartered lenders by means of their preemption 
authority.19  State regulation of state-­chartered lenders had a 
somewhat better record, with a few states adopting tougher 
predatory lending laws in response to the proliferation of 
 
16. )HGHUDORIILFLDOVLVVXHG´JXLGDQFHVµUHODWLQJWRVXESULPHOHQGLQJDQG
high loan-­to-­value residential real estate loans in 1999, 2001, 2006, and 2007.  
Subprime Mortgages: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 
111th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Sandra F. Braunstein, Director, Division of 
Consumer and Community Affairs), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/braunstein20070327a.ht
m. 
17. According to the Center for Responsible Lending, few loans met the 
VWDWXWH·V Whresholds for high upfront charges or high interest rates.  
Moreover, the law did not cover home purchase loans or home equity lines of 
credit at all.  WEI LI & KEITH S. ERNST, THE BEST VALUE IN THE SUBPRIME 
MARKET 4 (2006). 
18. Di Lorenzo, supra note 12, at 157-­159. 
19. For example, in a 2005 letter to Comptroller of the Currency John C. 
Dugan, Representative Barney Frank warned that federaO RIILFLDOV·
preemption of the application of state predatory lending laws to nationally 
FKDUWHUHG EDQNV UHVXOWHG LQ D ´UHJXODWRU\ YRLGµ EHFDXVH IHGHUDO RIILFLDOV
lacked the authority to adopt a uniform federal definition of predatory 
lending.  Letter from Congressman Barney Frank, Ranking Member of the 
House Committee on Financial Services, to Comptroller John C. Dugan, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Sept. 27, 2005), available at  
http://www.seattlepi.com/dayart/pdf/Barney_Frank_letter.pdf. 
7
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subprime loans and loans with novel terms.20  Even so, the fact 
that Ameriquest, one of the most prominent names in the 
current economic crisis, was state regulated suggests that 
existing state regulatory structures were sometimes 
outmatched.21 
 
B. Analogous Effects 
 
The effects of these two crises are also depressingly 
analogous.  It is difficult to distinguish photos of boarded 
neighborhoods in Love Canal from the more recent images 
emerging from neighborhoods in Minneapolis, Cleveland, New 
 
20. See generally LI & ERNST, supra note 17. 
21. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Financial Regulators Missed the Big 
Picture, Big Problems, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2009, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/27/business/fi-­ameriquest27.  As for the 
notorious American International Group (AIG), a finger-­pointing war has 
broken out pitting federal and state officials against each other over who was 
UHVSRQVLEOH IRU UHJXODWLQJ WKH ILUP·V RSHUDWLRQV  2Q WKH IHGHUDO VLGH IRXU
PHPEHUV RI &RQJUHVV RSLQHG LQ UHIHUHQFH WR $,* WKDW ´>F@OHDUO\ VRPH
insurers have become too complex and too interconnected world-­wide for the 
limited resources of state UHJXODWRUV WR KDQGOHµ  -RKQ ( Sununu et al., 
Opinion, Insurance Companies Need a Federal Regulator, WALL ST. J., Sept. 
23, 2008, at A27.  This op-­ed infuriated state officials, who noted that the 
state-­regulated insurance components of AIG were healthy and that the 
economic contagion originated in the part of AIG overseen by federal officials.  
For example, the Colorado Commissioner of Insurance wrote, 
 
[t]he AIG financial companies took on more risk than they 
FRXOG KDQGOH  %XW $,*·V RZQHUVKLS RI VWDWH-­regulated 
insurance companies was not part of the risk: Proposed 
transactions involving the assets of insurance carriers, 
protected by state regulators, are closely monitored to 
ensure they will not threaten the ability of the insurers to 
pay policyholder FODLPV  $,*·V ILQDQFLDO WURXEOHV DUH
contained within its noninsurance holding company, which 
is regulated by the U.S. Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).  
It is not held to the same investment, accounting and 
capital adequacy standards as its state-­regulated insurance 
subsidiaries. 
 
Marcy Morrison, Opinion, 6WDWH5HJXODWRUV¶*RWLW5LJKW·RQ$,*&ULVLV, COLO. 
STATESMAN, Oct. 3, 2008, available at 
http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/state-­regulators-­%3Fgot-­it-­
right%3F-­aig-­crisis.  This spat suggests that, even today, there are remaining 
barriers to collaboration between federal and state officials. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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York, and elsewhere, which have been gutted by subprime 
foreclosures.  Home vacancies of this sort have both an 
immediate adverse impact on the people who are displaced and 
result in a host of long-­term negative consequences for 
neighbors who remain in affected communities.  These 
community-­wide adverse impacts include increased crime, 
worsened sanitary and health conditions, depressed home 
values, and increased insurance rates.22 
It also appears that in both of these crises the worst 
impacts have been visited disproportionately on people living in 
poor and minority communities.  A long tradition of 
´HQYLURQPHQWDO MXVWLFHµ OLWHUDWXUHGRFXPHQWV WKH WHQGHQF\ IRU
polluters to locate their sites in lower income and minority 
communities.23  As early as 2000, a HUD study warned that 
subprime lending was concentrated in these same areas.24  
HUD found that subprime loans were three times more 
common in low-­income neighborhoods than in high-­income 
neighborhoods, and five times more common in African-­
American neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods.25  More 
recent studies confirm that these communities are now being 
hit particularly hard by foreclosures.26  One observer warns 
 
22. See, e.g., Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending 
Turmoil: A Public Purpose Approach, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 683, 693-­97 (2008). 
23. See MICHAEL B. GERRARD & SHEILA R. FOSTER, THE LAW OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (2008) and DAVID E. NEWTON, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK (1996), for collected essays on 
environmental justice issues. 
24. OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, supra note 11. 
25. Id. 
26. The Economic Policy Institute cites a number of studies suggesting 
that the disparities go well beyond mortgage lending, resulting in a: 
 
two-­tiered system of financial services . . . one featuring 
conventional products distributed by banks and savings 
institutions primarily for middle-­ and upper-­income, 
disproportionately white suburban markets and the other 
featuring high-­priced, often predatory products, offered by 
VXFK ´IULQJH EDQNHUVµ DV FKHFN-­cashers, payday lenders, 
pawnshops, and others, targeted at low-­income and 
predominantly minority communities concentrated in 
central cities. 
 
Gregory D. Squires, Do Subprime Loans Create Subprime Cities?, EPI 
BRIEFING PAPER, Feb. 28, 2008, at 3, available at http://www.shared 
9
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WKDW ´>L@I FXUUHQW WUHQGV FRQWLQXH LW LV TXLWH SRVVLEOH WKDW
subprime mortgages could cause the largest loss of African-­
$PHULFDQZHDOWKLQ$PHULFDQKLVWRU\µ27 
 
C. Analogous Political Responses 
 
By 1979, the sheer scale of the toxic waste crisis demanded 
a federally organized response.28  Even so, the political realities 
of late 1979 and early 1980³namely the election of President 
Reagan³counseled against a legislative response that could be 
criticized as an expanVLRQRI´ELJJRYHUQPHQWµIn this political 
environment, a program to make responsible parties share 
response costs was more likely to garner popular support than 
one that burdened only the taxpayer with these expenses.29 
 
prosperity.org/bp197/bp197.pdf (citation omitted).  Other reports note that 
the foreclosure crisis has hurt African-­American neighborhoods more than 
others because home-­ownership tends to be lower among African Americans 
and because home equity tends to serve as a principal source of wealth in 
these communities.  See, e.g., Jeff Kunerth, Foreclosure Crisis Hits Hard in 
Black Communities, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 4, 2008, at B3, available at 
2008 WLNR 8317842 (WestLaw). 
27. The Role of the Secondary Market in Subprime Mortgage Lending: 
Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 68 (2007) 
[hereinafter Hearings] (prepared testimony of Michael D. Calhoun, Center for 
Responsible Lending). 
28. See generally The Environmental Emergency Response Act: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong. 108 (1980) (agency testimony of 
'RXJODV 0 &RVWOH $GPLQLVWUDWRU (QYLURQPHQWDO 3URWHFWLRQ $JHQF\ ´,Q
1979, an EPA contractor estimated the total number of hazardous waste sites 
to range between 32,000 and 50,000, and the number of sites posing a 
significant heaOWKRUHQYLURQPHQWDOSUREOHPWREHEHWZHHQDQGµ 
29. Sen. Moynihan: 
 
May I call the committee's attention to [EPA Commissioner] 
&RVWOH·V VWDWHPHQW WKDW XQOLNH DOO RI WKH SUHYLRXV
environmental legislation of this last decade, this legislation 
does not establish a new regulatory regime.  It imposes costs 
and comes into play only where there is a specific problem.  
If there are no spills, there will be no expenditures.  If there 
is no damage, there will be no liability.  This is not an 
enterprise which will spend money regardless as if it were a 
program.  This is a fund to respond to specific problems and 
specific damages. 
 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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The politics of the toxic asset crisis have a similar 
resonance.  Once again, we are confronted by a crisis whose 
magnitude and scope demands large-­scale government action 
and both the Bush and Obama administrations have supported 
IHGHUDO ´EDLORXWµSURJUDPVWRDLG ILUPVVLFNHQHGE\VXESULme 
toxic assets.  At the same time, shrill and angry demands that 
those responsible for the crisis, rather than taxpayers, pay the 
price have become commonplace.30  It is reasonable to suppose 
that some satisfaction of these demands could factor into public 
support for additional expenditures. 
 
D. Similar Barriers to Legal Accountability 
 
In the case of hazardous waste, the principal barrier to 
imposing legal responsibility was that existing laws were 
simply inadequate to reach those responsible, meaning that the 
few anti-­pollution laws that did exist in this area did not 
 
Id. DW7KLVLGHDEHDUVREYLRXVUHODWLRQWRWKHEURDGHU´SROOXWHUSD\VµRU
´H[WHQGHG SURGXFHU UHVSRQVLELOLW\µ SULQFLSOH ZKLFK KROGV WKDW D SURGXFW·V
environmental costs should be internalized and made part of the cost of the 
product rather than externalized to/subsidized by society.  See ORG. OF ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES (1972) (Council Document no. C(72)128), available 
at http://www.ciesin.org/docs/008-­574/008-­574.html, for one of the first 
enunciations of this principle. 
30. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristoff, Op-­Ed., Save the Fat Cats, N.Y. TIMES, 
2FWDW$´>&@ULWLFVRIWKHEDLORXWKDYHUHDVRQWREHIXULRXV  It is 
profoundly unfair that working-­class American families lose their homes, 
their jobs, their savings, while plutocrats who caused the problem get 
rescued.  If the Congressional critics of the bailout want to do some lasting 
good, they should come back in January ³ after approving the bailout now ³ 
with a series of tough measures to improve governance and inject more 
IDLUQHVV LQ WKH HFRQRP\µ %HQ 6WHLQ 2SLQLRQ In Financial Food Chains, 
/LWWOH*X\V&DQ·W:LQ, N.Y. TIMES6HSWDW%8´7KHSHRSOHZKRVH
conduct got us into this catastrophe have not only taken our money, hopes 
and peace of mind, but they apparently also want a trillion or so more dollars 
to put into their Wall Street Buddy System Fund.  This may be the most 
dangerous attack on the law in my lifetime.  What anarchists even dared 
consider this plan?  Thank heaven that minds more devoted to the 
Constitution on Capitol Hill are questioning this shocking request.  By the 
way, if we are actually thinking about tossing the Constitution out the 
window, why not simply annul these credit-­default swap contracts?  With 
that done, the incomprehensibly large liability of the banks would cease, and 
ZHZRXOGQ·WQHHGWKLVVWDJJHULQJEDLORXW6KRXOGQ·WZHFRQVLGHUPDNLQJWKH
VSHFXODWRUVSD\VRPHRIWKHSULFH"µ 
11
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squarely address the problems associated with assigning 
liability for past dumping of hazardous wastes.31  Put simply, 
dumping hazardous wastes up to that point had been, in many 
cases, perfectly lawful.  And to the extent that laws were 
broken, effective enforcement actions would not only confront 
the ordinary barriers of litigation (political will, costly 
investigations, marshalling of proof adequate to meet criminal 
or civil standards), such actions would also have to be 
undertaken on a truly national scale in order to respond 
meaningfully and comprehensively to the nationwide problem.  
To complicate matters further, toxic waste dumping involved a 
host of potentially responsible actors³chemical feedstock 
manufacturers, consumers, waste haulers, dump owners³
among whom accountability somehow would have to be 
allocated.  And, given the lag time between dumping and the 
realization of environmental harm, even locating the 
potentially responsible partLHVZDVQ·WHQVXUHG 
The subprime mortgage crisis presents similar barriers to 
accountability.  First, as we have seen, the legal regime leading 
to the crisis has been largely permissive and non-­regulatory;; 
the lengthy period of deregulation from the 1980s to the near-­
present thus set the stage for the proliferation of some 
subprime lending practices which, while plainly destructive, 
did not necessarily violate laws.32  With respect to illegal 
conduct, it is true that some state attorneys general have gone 
after abusive lenders, and in this respect the states are once 
again ahead of the Federal Government, much as state 
legislatures led with predatory lending reform laws.33  Even so, 
litigation against a few readily prosecutable lenders is different 
from helping discrete communities recover from subprime 
foreclosures generated by a multitude of lenders.  Second, like 
the toxic waste crisis, the multitude of potentially responsible 
 
31. The Environmental Emergency Response Act, supra note 28, at 109. 
32. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
33. See, e.g., John F. Olson, Subprime-­Related Securities Litigation: 
Where Do We Go From Here?, in 40TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES 
REGULATION NOVEMBER 12-­14, 2008, at 120 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Series No. 14864, 2008), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Dickey-­Subprime-­
RelatedSecuritiesLit-­Insights_0408.pdf (noting several attorney general 
investigations and lawsuits). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
322 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:310 
 
actors³loan originators, borrowers, attorneys, appraisers, 
other support professionals, the secondary mortgage market³
complicates traditional fault-­based allocation of responsibility.  
Finally, many of these potentially responsible parties may, by 
now, be difficult to locate, not so much because of the passage 
of time as in the toxic waste crisis, but rather because under 
current economic circumstances many of these firms may be 
insolvent. 
Taken together, these observations suggest that the policy 
challenges posed by the toxic waste crisis of the late twentieth 
century and the toxic lending crisis of the early twenty-­first 
century are not very different.  Unusually risky commercial 
conduct;; the lack of a functional legal regime to curb the 
socially harmful aspects of that conduct;; the resulting need for 
costly, large-­scale government intervention;; loud popular 
demands for accountability;; and significant barriers to 
satisfying those demands³all of these characteristics are 
common to the two crises.  In light of these similarities, the 
next section shows how the Superfund solution developed for 
the former crisis might be adapted into a solution for the latter. 
 
II. Adapting Superfund to the Toxic Lending Crisis 
 
The previous section identified some commonalities 
between the toxic waste crisis and the toxic asset crisis³in 
particular, common adverse impacts on communities and 
common barriers to effective assignment of responsibility for 
those impacts.  This section first explains in greater detail the 
principal legal response to these challenges during the toxic 
waste crisis.  Then it suggests some modifications and updates 
to make this framework useful in the current lending crisis 
context. 
 
A. 2YHUYLHZRI6XSHUIXQG·V.H\/HJDO)HDWXUHV 
 
1HZ <RUN·V /RYH &DQDO WKH 9DOOH\ RI WKH 'UXPV LQ
Kentucky, and other similar disasters eventually forced federal 
lawmakers to confront the problem of dangerous and 
13
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unregulated hazardous chemical waste dumps.34  In the waning 
days of the Carter Administration, a remarkably unified 
Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), also 
NQRZQ DV ´6XSHUIXQGµ35  Superfund was designed to be a 
comprehensive solution, coupling new funding for cleanup with 
a new liability scheme aimed at imposing responsibility on 
those who created the problem. 
On the funding side, Congress created the eponymous 
´6XSHUIXQGµ DV DNLQGRI HQYLURQPHQWDO WUXVW IXQG WRSD\ IRU
both emergency responses and long-­term remediation of 
contaminated sites.  The fund was derived from four sources: 
´WD[HV RQ FUXGH RLO DQG FHUWDLQ FKHPLFDOV DV ZHOO DV DQ
environmental tax assessed on corporations based on their 
taxable income;; appropriations from the general fund;; fines, 
penalties, and recoveries from responsible parties;; and interest 
DFFUXHGRQWKHEDODQFHRIWKHIXQGµ36  Over the history of the 
program, taxes provided about 68% of the fund until 1995, 
when taxing authority expired;; since then, most of the funding 
has come from the general fund.37  Not all of the money in this 
trust fund is available for cleanup;; instead, Congress annually 
appropriates money from the trust fund to the Environmental 
3URWHFWLRQ$JHQF\(3$WRIXQG(3$·V6XSHUIXQGDFWLYLWLHV38  
EPA has received about $1.2 billion dollars each year on 
average from 1981 through 2007.39 
Complementing this financial response was a new federal 
liability scheme that sought to overcome the practical barriers 
to legal accountability identified in Part I.  This scheme has 
several key features, beginning with a very broad liability net40 
 
34. Ronald E. Cardwell, Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 509 
(Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 2009). 
35. Pub. L. No. 96-­510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-­9675 (2006)). 
36. U.S. GOV·T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SUPERFUND: FUNDING AND REPORTED 
COSTS OF ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION ACTIVITIES 3 (2008), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08841r.pdf. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, The Superfund Debate, in 
ANALYZING SUPERFUND 3 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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woven from three statutory and judicially manufactured 
elements: an expanVLYH VWDWXWRU\ GHILQLWLRQ RI ´SRWHQWLDOO\
UHVSRQVLEOH SDUWLHVµ RU ´353Vµ MXGLFLDO HQGRUVHPHQW RI MRLQW-­
and-­several liability;; and judicial willingness to loosen the 
usual limitations on corporate liability. 
The statutory PRP definition comprises current site 
owners and operators, former owners and operators who were 
involved with the site when hazardous wastes were disposed 
there, persons who arranged for disposal of their hazardous 
wastes at the site, and those who transported hazardous waste 
to the site.41  The statute thus targets several different classes 
of persons and entities who shared in (and likely profited from) 
creating the problem.42 
Subsequent case law interpreting the statute augmented 
the liability net in two ways.  First, courts established that the 
liability of these different parties was joint and several.43  This 
feature created incentives for identified PRPs to locate 
additional PRPs in order to share cleanup costs, furthering the 
accountability function of the statute.  Second, some courts 
recognized that Superfund was meant to go beyond corporate 
forms and reach parent corporations and officers where they 
H[HUFLVHGFRQWURORYHUDFRUSRUDWLRQ·VKD]DUGRXVZDVWHGLVSRVDO
activities.44 
Another key feature of Superfund is that it imposed new 
liability for past conduct³even lawful conduct.  Considering 
the importance of this feature, the Superfund statute is oddly 
circumspect about its retroactive application;; however, the 
prevailing judicial construction of the Superfund statute treats 
its liability provisions as reaching conduct pre-­dating the 
statute, based on the use of the past-­WHQVH ´RZQHGµ
´RSHUDWHGµ ´DUUDQJHGµ ´DFFHSWHGµ WR GHVFULEH WKH NLQGV RI
actions giving rise to liability, the obviously remedial nature of 
 
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1) ² (4) (2006).  See also discussion infra Part 
II.B.2. 
42. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55-­56 & n.1 (1998) 
´>7@KRVHDFWXDOO\¶UHVSRQVLEOHIRUDQ\ damage, environmental harm, or injury 
IURPFKHPLFDOSRLVRQV>PD\EHWDJJHGZLWK@WKHFRVWRIWKHLUDFWLRQV·µ 
43. See, e.g., Cardwell, supra note 34, at 530-­31, n.89 & cases cited 
therein. 
44. Id. 
15
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WKH ODZ DQG WKH ODZ·V legislative history.45  Although the 
United States Supreme Court has never expressly weighed in, 
the Eighth Circuit has upheld this retroactive application 
against both substantive due process and takings clause 
challenges.46 
Finally, Superfund also has been consistently interpreted 
by courts as a strict liability statute³another key feature.47  
Thus, a waste producer has been held liable even where the 
FRXUW FRQFOXGHG WKDW LW ZDV ´FOHDUµ WKDW WKH FRPSDQ\ ´WRRN
HYHU\SUHFDXWLRQLQWKHGLVSRVDORILWVZDVWHVµ48  The utility of 
the strict liability standard, of course, is that it makes the 
JRYHUQPHQW·V FDVH VLPSOHU E\ HOLPLQDWLQJ WKH QHHG WR SURYH
failure to live up to a particular standard of care. 
 
B. $GDSWLQJ6XSHUIXQG·V)HDWXUHVWRWKH7R[LF$VVHW&ULVLV 
 
The Superfund regime outlined above provides a tested set 
of legal tools enabling the government to impose broad, after-­
the-­fact liability on commercial actors for harms generated by 
their conduct.  This section examines how some of these 
essential features might be adapted to achieve effective legal 
accountability for response costs arising from the toxic lending 
crisis.  Along the way, this section also develops some initial 
definitions and statutory terms. 
Fundamentally, this discussion involves a set of policy 
questions: What harms has the toxic lending crisis created for 
communities?  Who is most responsible for these harms?  And, 
ZKDWOHJDOUXOHVRXJKWWRGHILQHUHVSRQVLEOHSHUVRQV·OLDELOLW\" 
 
 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 
 WK &LU  ´,Q RUGHU WR EH HIIHFWLYH &(5&/$ PXVt reach past 
FRQGXFWµ 
46. Id. at 733-­34. 
47. See, e.g., William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Generators 
Pursuant to § 107(a)(3) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3)), 126 
A.L.R. FED 265 § 2[a] (1995). 
48. 2·1HLOY3LFLOOR)6XSS'5, 1988). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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1. Identifying Harms: Liability for Government Response 
Costs 
 
Consistent with its focus on accountability, Superfund 
imposed liability in part to help compensate the government for 
response costs initially borne by taxpayers to help clean up 
contaminated hazardous waste sites.  An adaptation of 
Superfund to the toxic lending crisis similarly should focus on 
recovering the costs to the public fisc resulting from toxic 
lending practices.  These costs already include many different 
kinds of public services at the local level, ranging from the cost 
RI D VKHULII·V GHSXW\ HQIRUcing a foreclosure to the cost of 
increased police and fire responses to emergencies involving 
vacant foreclosed buildings.49  At the federal level, response 
costs might include the price of mortgage relief programs and 
other efforts to keep those homes involved in foreclosure 
occupied.50  $GHILQLWLRQ RI ´UHVSRQVH FRVWVµ WKDW HQFRPSDVVHV
these costs might provide: 
 
Response costs defined.  7KH WHUP ´UHVSRQVH
FRVWVµPHDQVDQ\FRVWVERUQHE\ ORFDO VWDWHDQG
Federal Government agencies arising from (a) the 
enforcement of foreclosure relating to a subprime 
mortgage loan, (b) emergency response at property 
vacated as a result of subprime foreclosure, or (c) 
government expenditures towards maintaining 
occupancy at a specifically identified property 
encumbered by a subprime loan in foreclosure. 
 
 
49. See Cox, supra note 22, at 694-­95. 
50. For example, the $75 billion Homeowner Affordability and Stability 
Plan (HASP) provides monetary incentives to lenders to restructure the 
terms of potentially problematic mortgage loans in order to prevent 
foreclosures.  U.S. DEP·T OF TREASURY, HOMEOWNER AFFORDABILITY AND 
STABILITY PLAN (2009), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/eesa/homeowner-­affordability-­
plan/FactSheet.pdf.  Pursuing recovery of these costs might be considered³to 
the extent that these funds are provided to lenders who are not themselves 
potentially liable. 
17
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2. Identifying Responsible Parties: Defining the Toxic 
Lending PRP Class 
 
A definition of PRPs may be broken into two elements, one 
which I will call ´situationalµ and the other ´categorical.µ  By 
situational, I literally mean to invoke the concept of a 
Superfund site, a discrete geographical area that helps to 
define the range of PRPs for a particular set of response costs.51  
,Q WKH FDVH RI WKH WR[LF OHQGLQJ FULVLV D ´VLWHµ PLJKW EH D
defined neighborhood or community which, based on 
measurable neighborhood-­wide criteria such as property 
values, crime rates, and so forth, is significantly distressed as a 
result of subprime lending foreclosures in that neighborhood.  
Within such sites, there are several categories of actors who 
profited from the risky commercial practices that precipitated 
the toxic asset crisis.  What follows is a brief catalog of 
potential candidates for liability, divided into three categories: 
primary market commercial actors, secondary market actors, 
and borrowers. 
Primary market commercial actors.  An obvious 
starting point in developing a catalog of potentially responsible 
parties is subprime loan originators.  Individual originators 
were responsible for attracting and evaluating potential 
borrowers, crafting appropriate loan terms, and communicating 
those terms and their risks to borrowers.52  As an industry, 
loan originators sometimes resisted state efforts towards 
clearer disclosures and underwriting standards.53 
Originators were assisted by a range of professionals 
whose work made the subprime lending boom possible³for 
better and for worse.  Among these, appraisers have already 
been singled out for questionable practices such as colluding 
with originators to exaggerate home values in order to permit 
 
51. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.400 through 300.440 for the regulations 
JRYHUQLQJWKH(3$·VSURFHVVIRULGHQWLI\LQJDQGSULRULWL]LQJVLWHV 
52. See generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW 
TODAY·S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
(2008). 
53. Binyamin Appelbaum, State Toughens Rules on Mortgages, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 18, 2007, at B1. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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larger loans.54  Attorneys, closers, and other professionals55 
may have been less instrumental in developing the terms of 
specific loans, but they nevertheless profited from the subprime 
lending boom and might reasonably be included in a PRP 
definition. 
Secondary market actors.  There is widespread 
agreement that the advent of the secondary mortgage market 
fundamentally changed the incentives and behaviors of 
primary market actors.56  By simultaneously creating a huge 
demand for mortgage loans that could be bundled together into 
new kinds of securities and by using this bundling mechanism 
to buffer the risk of any individual loan going bad, the 
secondary market encouraged lax primary market practices. 
 
Historically, mortgages have been safe 
investments with a commensurate rate of return 
for investors.  But the growth of the subprime 
market offered mortgages that provided a higher-­
risk investment with potential for higher 
returns.  Wall Street became ravenous for these 
loans, seeking mortgages that provide a high 
yield.  This demand from Wall Street encouraged 
subprime lenders to abandon reasonable 
qualifying standards, to forget about standard 
documentation requirements, and to ignore 
whether borrowers could actually afford the 
 
54. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, Appraisal Changes Face Resistance, 
WASH. POST, May 10, 2008, at F01. 
55. How about the programmer who wrote the software that enabled 
mortgages to be securitized and traded?  See generally Michael Osinski, My 
Manhattan Project: How I Helped Build the Bomb that Blew Up Wall Street, 
N.Y. MAG., Mar. 29, 2009. 
56. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 27, at 68 (testimony of Michael D. 
Calhoun) ´Because loans are sold on the secondary market, the parties who 
actually interact with the borrowers during the loan process³mortgage 
brokers and lenders³have very little financial interest in whether the loan 
SHUIRUPVEH\RQGDQHDUO\SD\PHQWGHIDXOWSHULRGµ7KLVLVQRWWKHILUVWWLPH
someone has argued that the secondary market shapes the behaviors of the 
primary market.  See, e.g., Ronald K. Schuster, Lending Discrimination: Is 
the SeFRQGDU\0DUNHW+HOSLQJWR0DNHWKH´$PHULFDQ'UHDPµD5HDOLW\", 36 
GONZ. L. REV. 153 (2001) (suggesting that practices in the secondary market 
may cause disparate impact discrimination in the primary market). 
19
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loan.57 
 
Moreover, it has been argued that the secondary market 
directly benefited from some of the more problematic loan 
practices in the primary market, such as the imposition of pre-­
payment penalties buried in the terms of so-­FDOOHG´H[SORGLQJµ
adjustable-­rate mortgages (ARMs).58 
Determining which kinds of actors within the secondary 
market ought to be included in a categorical PRP definition 
remains a challenge, for it is clear that a range of professional 
GLVFLSOLQHVSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKH´V\QWKHWLFWHFKQLTXHVµWKDWPDGH
possible a secondary market in mortgage-­backed securities.59  I 
will not attempt here to more precisely define the contours of 
´VHFRQGDU\ PDUNHW DFWRUVµ DQG ´VHFRQGDU\ PDUNHW DFWLRQVµ
giving rise to liability.  It is clear, however, that the secondary 
PDUNHW·V UROH LQHQFRXUDJLQJKeedless subprime lending while 
earning profits from that behavior warrants inclusion of some 
set of secondary market actors in a PRP definition. 
Borrowers.  It might seem regressive to include 
borrowers in a catalog of persons who ought to be liable for 
government response costs caused by subprime foreclosures.  
But research indicates that at least one type of borrower³the 
non-­occupant landlord/investor³played a significant role in 
generating the community harms that are the focus of this 
proposal. 
As Professor Cox points out, landlords are essentially 
LQYHVWRUV ZKR DUH PRUH OLNHO\ WR ´WUHDW WKHLU GHFLVLRQV LQ
IRUHFORVXUH VROHO\ DV D PDWWHU RI ILQDQFLDO LQWHUHVWµ WKDQ
 
57. Hearings, supra note 27, at 67 (testimony of Michael D. Calhoun). 
58. See, e.g., id. at 70-­71 (arguing that investors benefited from so-­called 
´H[SORGLQJ$50Vµ³adjustable rate mortgages with terms the borrower was 
unlikely to meet after the initial teaser period³because such loans provided 
short duration, predictable income streams and because investors profited 
from pre-­payment penalties paid by borrowers seeking to escape their 
exploding loans). 
59. Id. at 13 (testimony of Howard Mulligan, Partner, McDermott Will & 
(PHU\ ´7KH SURIHVVLRQDOV³the lawyers, the accountants, the investment 
bankers³that structure mortgage-­backed transactions have formulated 
innovative methods, including derivative enhancements, and other synthetic 
techniques, of segmenting the risks associated with investing in mortgages, 
and creating securities that allow investors to assume the precise level of risk 
WRZKLFKWKDWLQGLYLGXDOLQYHVWRULVFRPIRUWDEOHµ 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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homeowners who may have significant nonfinancial 
attachments to a home or community.60  An official of the 
Mortgage Bankers Association observes that  
 
these investors are among the first to default if 
they see that home prices are falling and there is 
little chance of recouping their money, much less 
making a big profit.  Rather than throwing good 
money after bad by continuing to make 
payments, these borrowers will stop making 
payments rather abruptly.61 
 
There is nothing unlawful about a landlord choosing 
foreclosure under these circumstances.  It is perfectly rational 
commercial behavior under the current legal regime.  But, of 
course, that is the problem: like hazardous waste disposal 
before Superfund, the costs of rational but dangerous 
commercial conduct are visited upon innocent bystanders and 
externalized to taxpayers generally.  In this casHWKHODQGORUG·V
FKRLFH WR JR LQWR IRUHFORVXUH UDWKHU WKDQ ´WKURZ JRRG PRQH\
DIWHU EDGµ JHQHUDWHV D KRVW RI FRVWV IRU VRFLHW\ ZLWK WKH
ODQGORUG·V GLVSODFHG WHQDQWV IHHOLQJ WKH LPSDFWVPRVW DFXWHO\ 
These costs warrant considering creating a category of liability 
IRU´ERUURZHUDFWLRQVµ 
 
 
60. Cox, supra note 22, at 711 & n.171.  See also Kristopher Gerardi, 
Adam Hale Shapiro & Paul S. Willen, Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, 
Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures 20 (Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, 
Working Paper No. 07-­15, 2008), available at 
KWWSZZZERVIUERUJHFRQRPLFZSZSZSSGI ´%RUURZHUVZKRDUH
not owner-­occupants, but who purchased the property strictly for investment 
purposes, are likely greater default risks [all things being equal].  Since non-­
owner occupants do not face mobility costs and do not have an emotional 
stake in the property, their cost of default is likely lower relative to the cost 
to owner-­RFFXSDQWVµ 
61. Jay Brinkmann, An Examination of Mortgage Foreclosures, 
Modifications, Repayment Plans and Other Loss Mitigation Activities in the 
Third Quarter of 2007, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS·N, Jan. 2008, at 7, available 
at 
http://www.mbaa.org/files/News/InternalResource/59454_LoanModificationsS
urvey.pdf. 
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3. Identifying Legal Rules: Adapting Superfund Legal 
Features to the Mortgage Crisis 
 
7KHPRVWHVVHQWLDO IHDWXUHVRI6XSHUIXQG·V OHJDOUHJLPH³
retroactivity, strict and joint-­and-­several liability, and the 
rules of parent and officer liability³all flow from judicial 
interpretations rather than explicit statutory commands.  As 
case law developments over the years suggest, legislators 
hoping to create a similar regime for the toxic lending crisis 
ought to make these features explicit in the statute rather than 
relying on courts to supply them, as they did with Superfund. 
Retroactivity.  In recent years, the Supreme Court has 
IDYRUHG D ´FOHDU VWDWHPHQW UXOHµ DSSURDFK WR DQDO\]LQJ
retroactive legislation, permitting courts to avoid confronting 
WKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RIDVWDWXWHE\UHDGLQJDZD\WKHVWDWXWH·V
constitutionally questionable meaning.  The starting point is 
an interpretive presumption in favor of prospective application 
and against retroactive application;; this presumption can be 
RYHUFRPH LI &RQJUHVV ´H[SUHVVO\ PDQGDWHVµ WKDW WKH VWDWXWH
should apply retroactively, which rarely happens.62  Absent 
such an express mandate, the statute may not be read as 
retroactive.  Thus, to avoid any interpretive diversion of 
purpose, the text of a Superfund-­style economic remediation 
statute should expressly provide for retroactive application 
rather than depend on the kind of searching judicial 
examination that managed to find retroactive intent by way of 
the verb tenses chosen by SuperfunG·VDXWKRUV63  For example: 
 
Retroactive application.  This chapter is 
intended to have retroactive effect and shall apply 
with equal force to primary subprime lending 
actions, secondary market actions, and borrower 
actions that occurred prior to and after the 
 
62. See, e.g., Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 352-­53 (1999);; INS v. St. 
Cyr, 533 U.6    ´The first step in the impermissible-­
retroactive-­effect determination is to ascertain whether Congress has 
GLUHFWHGZLWKWKHUHTXLVLWHFODULW\WKDWWKHODZEHDSSOLHGUHWURVSHFWLYHO\µ. 
63. Indeed, if not for long-­standing judicial and administrative 
interpretations, the current Court might question whether Congress intended 
Superfund itself to be retroactive. 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/22
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effective date of this legislation. 
 
Once this interpretive barrier is cleared, the constitutional 
DQDO\VLV LV HVVHQWLDOO\ WKH VDPH DV LW ZDV ZKHQ 6XSHUIXQG·V
retroactivity was reviewed by courts.  Then, as now, retroactive 
civil statutes challenged under the Due Process Clause must 
VDWLVI\ D UDWLRQDO EDVLV WHVWZKLFK ´LVPHW VLPSO\ E\ VKRZLQJ
that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself 
MXVWLILHG E\ D UDWLRQDO OHJLVODWLYH SXUSRVHµ64  This test was 
applied before Superfund to uphold retroactive expansion of 
PLQHRZQHUOLDELOLW\IRUWKHLUZRUNHUV·UHVSLUDWRU\LOOQHVVHV65 it 
was applied in the 1980s by the Eighth Circuit in NEPACCO 
and by other courts, though never the Supreme Court, to 
XSKROG6XSHUIXQG·VUHWURDFWLYLW\66  It was also applied in 1992 
by the Supreme Court to uphold a Michigan workers 
compensation statute that had the effect of forcing some firms 
to provide refunds to some of their disabled employees.67  
Perhaps the most useful component of this line of case law is 
this observation by the Court: 
 
It is by now well established that legislative acts 
adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic 
life come to the Court with a presumption of 
constitutionality, and that the burden is on one 
complaining of a due process violation to 
establish that the legislature has acted in an 
arbitrary and irrational way.68 
 
Against this standard, a Superfund-­style economic cleanup 
statute likely would pass constitutional muster.  Requiring the 
persons who caused an expensive mess to help defray the costs 
of cleaning it up is neither arbitrary nor irrational and has 
been adjudicated to be reasonable by circuit courts in the 
 
64. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31 (1994) (quoting Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730 (1984)). 
65. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976). 
66. &RQW·O ,QV&RVY1H3KDUP	&KHP&R)GWK&LU
1988). 
67. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 (1992). 
68. Usery, 428 U.S. at 15 (citations omitted). 
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Superfund context.  Invalidating a Superfund-­style economic 
cleanup statute thus would require a significant departure 
from established constitutional principles, a consideration 
ZKLFKRXJKWWRRIIVHWVXFKDPHDVXUH·VRIIHQVHWRVRPHMXGLFLDO
sensibilities. 
Strict liability and joint-­and-­several liability.  The 
XWLOLW\ RI LPSRUWLQJ 6XSHUIXQG·V VWULFW OLDELOLW\ VWDQGDUG DQG
joint-­and-­several liability allocation rules into the toxic lending 
setting does not require much elaboration.69  The former would 
allow the government to pursue recoveries irrespective of 
whether fraud or other unlawful conduct can be proven or is 
even suspected, freeing officials to target their response efforts 
WRZDUGVVSHFLILFGLVWUHVVHGDUHDV´VLWHVµUDWKHUWKDQWKHPRVW
prosecutable lenders.  The latter maximizes government 
resources by shifting the incentive to find PRPs from 
government to other PRPs³a particularly important 
consideration given recent upheavals in the primary and 
secondary markets.  Given the importance of these features, 
lawmakers ought not depend on judicial benevolence;; they 
should make these features explicit: 
 
Strict and joint-­and-­several liability.  All 
primary subprime lending actors, secondary 
market actors, and borrower actors shall be 
strictly, jointly, and severally liable for response 
costs at a site. 
 
Parent and officer liability.  In the absence of clear 
statutory guidance, courts applying Superfund developed 
several models of Superfund parent corporation liability.70  
 
69. Interestingly, Georgia legislators have proposed a measure that 
would allow borrowers and state regulators to hold banks involved in buying 
mortgage-­backed securities responsible for violation of state predatory 
lending laws.  See, e.g., Joe Rauch, Fair Lending Act Amendment Stirs 
Debate, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON., Feb. 18, 2009, available at 
http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2009/02/16/daily50.html.  In 
*HRUJLDOHJLVODWRUVDSSURYHGDVLPLODU´SDVV-­WKURXJKµOLDELOLW\PHDVXUH
but rolled it back in 2003.  Robert Berner & Brian Grow, They Warned Us 
About the Mortgage Crisis, Bus. Wk., Oct. 9, 2008, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_42/b4104036827981.htm. 
70. See, e.g., 14 JENNIFER L. BERGER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6770 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2003). 
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Some held that a parent was liable if it had authority to control 
a subsidiary, regardless of whether it exercised that control.71  
Others required that the parent actually exercise that control.72  
Still others rejected any approach other than traditional veil 
piercing doctrines that focused on abuse of the corporate 
form.73 
In 1998, the Supreme Court sought to resolve the 
conflicting standards in United States v. Bestfoods.74  There, 
WKH &RXUW WUHDWHG &RQJUHVV·V VLOHQFH RQ SDUHQW FRUSRUDWLRQ
liability as a tacit affirmation of common-­law corporate liability 
principles.  Reviewing these principles, the Court drew a 
distinction between derivative and direct parent liability.75  
The Court observed that under the common law, a derivative 
VXLW DJDLQVW D VXEVLGLDU\·VSDUHQW UHTXLUHG WKDW WKH FRUSRUDWH
veil be pierced.76  The Court, however, went on to observe that 
the common law has long recognized direct parent liability 
where ´WKHDOOHJHGZURQJFDQVHHPLQJO\EHWUDFHGWRWKHSDUHQW
through the conduit of its own personnel and management 
[and] the parent is directly a participant in the wrong 
FRPSODLQHGRIµ77  7KH&RXUWLQWHUSUHWHG6XSHUIXQG·V´RSHUDWRUµ
liability as consistent with this notion of direct liability and 
KHOG WKDWDSDUHQW FRUSRUDWLRQ WKDW ´RSHUDWHVµ LWV VXEVLGLDU\·V
hazardous waste facility may be liable under Superfund.78  The 
&RXUW ODPHQWHG WKH ´XVHOHVVQHVVµ RI &RQJUHVV·V WDXWRORJLFDO
GHILQLWLRQRIWKHWHUP´RSHUDWRUµDV´DQ\SHUVRQRSHUDWLQJµD
facility, and resorted to dictionary definitions.79  The result is a 
GHILQLWLRQRIRSHUDWRUDVDSHUVRQZKR´PDQDJH>V@GLUHFW>V@RU
conduct[s] operations specifically related to pollution, that is, 
operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of 
 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
75. Id. at 64-­65. 
76. Id. at 62-­64. 
77. Id. at 64 (citation and footnote omitted). 
78. Id. at 61. 
79. Id. DW´7KLVPXFKLVHDV\WRVD\WKHGLIILFXOW\FRPHVLQGHfining 
DFWLRQVVXIILFLHQWWRFRQVWLWXWHGLUHFWSDUHQWDO¶RSHUDWLRQ·+HUHRIFRXUVHZH
PD\DJDLQUXHWKHXVHOHVVQHVVRI&(5&/$·VGHILQLWLRQRIDIDFLOLW\·V¶RSHUDWRU·
DV¶DQ\SHUVRQRSHUDWLQJDIDFLOLW\·ZKLFKOHDYHVXVWRGRWKHEHVWZH
can WRJLYHWKHWHUPLWV¶RUGLQDU\RUQDWXUDOPHDQLQJ·µFLWDWLRQRPLWWHG 
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hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with 
HQYLURQPHQWDOUHJXODWLRQVµ80 
The proliferation of different views of parent liability that 
was partially resolved in Bestfoods illustrates the need for an 
explicit statutory rule³and the range of possibilities open to 
legislators in designing that rule.  Looking at these various 
options from those least likely to generate parental liability 
(e.g., insisting that the corporate veil be pierced in any action) 
to those more likely to lead to liability (e.g., requiring only the 
authority to control the subsidiary), the Bestfoods rule, which 
requires veil piercing for purely derivative actions but permits 
direct liability where the parent was directly involved in the 
harmful conduct, occupies a place in between the extremes and 
DOUHDG\PHHWVWKH&RXUW·VDSSURYDOPDNLQJ LWDJRRGVWDUWLQJ
point for crafting more specifically tailored parent liability 
provisions.  A provision based on the Bestfoods rule governing 
the liability of parent corporations in the primary market 
might provide: 
 
Primary market parent corporation 
liability.  A parent corporation is liable for 
response costs resulting from primary subprime 
lending actions by its subsidiary if the parent 
managed, directed, or conducted operations 
having to do with primary subprime lending 
actions, or decisions about compliance with 
regulations applicable to primary subprime 
lending actions including nonbinding guidance 
issued by state or federal authorities. 
 
Similar rules might be utilized for the other PRP categories 
and for the imposition of officer liability³the latter being an 
important concern in light of the likely insolvency of many 
corporate PRPs. 
 
 
80. Id. at 66-­67. 
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III. Conclusion 
 
The stark reality is that taxpayers have already committed 
to a partial Superfund solution: billions have been invested in 
propping up ailing firms mixed up in the subprime mess, and 
doubtless more will be spent trying to get communities back on 
their feet.  The outstanding question is whether policymakers 
have the courage and wisdom to couple this Superfund-­style 
expenditure with Superfund-­style accountability.  The 
analogous causes and effects of toxic waste and toxic lending 
ZDUUDQWORRNLQJWR6XSHUIXQGODZ·VUHDG\-­made set of statutory 
and case law precedents as the basis for imposing strict, joint-­
and-­several, and retroactive liability on the parties responsible 
for the present crisis. 
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